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GOVERNING PETS AND THEIR HUMANS 




Over approximately the last century, the major pieces of legislation 
that govern pets and their humans in New South Wales have been the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979, the Crimes Act 1900 
(NSW), the Dog and Goat Act 1898, the Dog Act 1966 and the 
Companion Animal Act 1998. Using a governmentality-based 
methodology, this article reveals that the changes in the regulation of 
dogs from the Dog Act 1966 to the Companion Animal Act 1998 show 
a shift from controlling dogs to governing dog owners. 
Introduction 
There is a substantial and growing literature on the connections between humans 
and animals. This research comes from many perspectives, including the issue of 
animal rights,1 the complexities of the pet–human relationship,2 the connections 
between nature, animals and humans,3 philosophical analyses of the status of 
animals,4 the cultural and social history of animals in Australia5 and the 
psychological benefits of animal companionship.6 Much of this literature explores 
the place of pets in modernity, and looks at how integral to and beneficial pets are 
in many people’s lives. However, there is very little consideration of the legislative 
regulation of pets and their humans in the literature.7 All Australian states and 
territories have legislation that regulates human–animal relations. 
Over approximately the last century, the major pieces of legislation8 that 
govern pets and their humans in New South Wales have been the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals Act 1979, the Crimes Act 1900, the Dog and Goat Act 1898, the 
Dog Act 1966 and the Companion Animal Act 1998.9 Using a governmentality-
                                                           
* Lecturer, Faculty of Arts, University of Wollongong. The Faculty of Arts, University of 
Wollongong, contributed to the research undertaken in this paper. 
1  Tester (1992); Singer (1995); Hills (2005). 
2  Newby (1999). 
3  Eder (1996); Macnaghten and Urry (1996). 
4  Steeves (1999). 
5  Franklin (2006). 
6  Brown (2003); Greenebaum (2004). 
7  One exception is Newby (1999), pp. 226-9, 244-5. 
8  Unless stated, the Acts under consideration are the original versions without any 
amendments. 
9  Currently in New South Wales there are three primary Acts that cover the interactions 
between pets and their owners and others, The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 
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based methodology, this article reveals that the regulation of dogs from the Dog Act 
1966 to the Companion Animal Act 199810 shows a shift from controlling dogs to 
governing dog owners. 
I have used the term ‘pet’ and ‘owner’ throughout the paper instead of 
‘companion animal’ because ‘pet’ more closely reflects the fact that, ultimately, 
these animals are owned as pieces of property.11 Despite stronger affective ties, the 
bottom line is that they are sentient things to be owned. They can be owned as 
companions, working dogs, hunting or fighting dogs, but underlying all this is the 
fact that they can be traded in on a newer, better model, they can be simply dumped 
and they can sit out in the backyard, like a thing, and be ignored except — 
hopefully — for feeding. 
Many people would not think of their dog as property, but for me being a 
companion is built on, or overlays, dogs’ status as property. I recently purchased a 
‘thing’ from the pound. This ‘thing’ was incredibly hard work, disobedient, 
destructive, stubborn, chased cars, bikes, joggers and even a helicopter, and had 
boundless energy. I thought many times, ‘I wish I could take her back and get an 
easier model’. Of course I could not do this because she is not a thing to me: she is 
a dog — a sentient being, with certain behaviours that did not fit my expectations. 
At that stage, she was not my companion — she was another thing to worry about. 
Legally my dog is a thing; culturally and emotionally she is now my companion, 
but she is still a dog, not my baby or my little shmookins. She became my dog-
companion once her behaviour started to meet my expectations; some of her 
‘dogness’ had to be modified. Her rise to companion status is built on my 
ownership of her and its concomitant responsibilities, and has resulted from my 
affection for her.  
Franklin argues that dogs and cats have always played companion roles; 
however, ‘whereas in the 1950s and 1960s pets were frequently fashionable 
accessories or bought for recreational or entertainment purposes, from the 1970s 
onwards companionability is emphasised more and entertainment and décor rather 
less’.12 Franklin’s latest research shows that Australian pet owners have very strong 
                                                                                                                                         
1979, The Crimes Act 1900 and the Companions Animal Act 1998. The Crimes Act 1900 
covers offences such as using a dog as a weapon, stealing a dog or dog’s skin, and 
bestiality. These provisions are much more about the consequences for humans (loss of 
property, injury, death, or a transgression of the moral code) than they are about the 
welfare of animals. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 attempts to prohibit 
human conduct that is harmful to animals, and in doing so establishes a framework for 
the barely acceptable ways an animal should be treated by its human 
owners/experimenters. This Act requires, for example, that food and drink be provided, 
assaults not occur, experiments can occur within limitations and unsafe travel is 
prohibited. 
10  The Companions Animal Act 1998 is a state government Act, and the state government 
has responsibility for reviewing and updating the Act, and establishing a statewide 
register. Through the Companion Animals Regulation, its implementation is largely the 
responsibility of local councils. 
11  Wise (2007–08), p 57. 
12  Franklin (1999), p 94. 
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emotional ties to their animals.13 The research on pets as therapy is now 
considerable. It attributes many health benefits for people who own or come in 
contact with mostly dogs, but also cats. In this role, the animal is benign and 
beneficial. These animals are often trained and socialised to be an animal that is like 
a human carer. As companion animals and therapeutic animals have become a more 
emotionally and physically integrated part of owners’ lives, they and other animals 
have also become more highly regulated and apparently threatening.  
In order to chart the changes in the regulation of pets and their owners, the 
Dog Act 1966 and the Companions Animal Act 1998 are compared. The main aims 
of the comparison are to examine how problems of government are configured and 
then addressed, to add regulation to the types of analyses of human–animal 
relations in the current literature, and to provide an analysis that allows for 
reflection on how a shift in governing owners affects the status and welfare of dogs. 
The parliamentary debates and the Dog Act 1966 and Companions Animal Act 1998 
are addressed primarily through governmentality. 
Governmentality 
Governmentality-based studies focus on a wide range of topics, including the 
regulation of crime and the politics of crime prevention,14 insurance and risk,15 
pregnancy,16 self-esteem,17 the administration of rural assistance schemes18 and 
substance use/abuse.19 Compared with these areas, the regulation of pets is 
seemingly a small topic of little importance. It seems to have no connection to 
capitalism, globalisation or the market, as many governmentality studies have done. 
However, the regulation of pets and their owners is important because it goes to the 
quality and qualities of everyday life experiences for the animals, for pet owners, 
and for the newer priorities of the community: the environment and wildlife. The 
big question posed by governmentality concerns how we are governed in advanced 
liberal societies and the effect this has on who we can be within certain forms of 
government. One of the uses of governmentality as a method is that it can bring this 
big question to bear on the minutia of everyday life. This research forms part of the 
mosaic of regulation in an advanced liberal society.  
                                                           
13  Based on a national survey, Franklin (2006), pp 206–11, found that 82 per cent of 
respondents kept their dog for companionship and 26 per cent for amusement, and 
80 per cent of respondents kept their cat for companionship; 88 per cent of urban 
dwellers thought that their animal was member of the family, 76 per cent allowed their 
animal into the lounge/family area and 52 per cent into the respondent’s bedroom. 
14  O’Malley (1997). 
15  Ewald (1991). 
16  Ruhl (1999); Weir (1996). 
17  Cruikshank (1996). 
18  Higgins (2004). 
19  Valverde (1998). 
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Governing in an advanced liberal society requires a certain kind of freedom 
and capacity to self-govern. Dean argues on ‘liberalism as a regime of government’ 
that:20 
This is a subject whose freedom is a condition of subjection. The exercise of 
authority presupposes the existence of a free subject of need, desire, rights, 
interests and choice. However its subjection is also a condition of freedom: in 
order to act freely, the subject must be shaped, guided and moulded into one 
capable of responsibly exercising that freedom through systems of 
domination. Subjection and subjectification are laid upon each other.21 
The enactment of legislation is an act of government in the obvious sense — 
that is, the elected representatives take an action to prohibit/allow certain conducts 
by persons, companies or governments. To take effect in regulating persons, this 
enactment presupposes a certain kind of individual, as Dean argues. Without this 
kind of individual the legislation could not have its normative function, nor could it 
provide the ideational material from which an individual could be censured by other 
citizens. In drawing on a Foucauldian analysis, there is the conventional governing 
through legislation and regulations, but the legislation’s intelligibility and efficacy 
are premised in a particular type of liberal individual. In the Companions Animal 
Act 1998, there are some provisions that function in this conventional sense of 
governing. These include compulsory registration, microchipping and the powers to 
regulate dangerous dogs. However, much of the Act requires self-governing — like 
walking a dog on a leash and disposing of faeces correctly, because enforceability 
and sanctioning are rarely possible. 
Thus the degree to which our relations with pets are currently dictated by self-
governance and the conventional sense of government, through legislation and 
regulations supervised by various state bodies, is prima facie difficult to disentangle 
at an empirical level. The Companions Animal Act 1998 was drafted within an 
advanced liberal society (and concomitant mentalities of rule), and it logically 
instantiates a subject whose freedom to choose occurs through the subjection of the 
legislation. The crucial point is that the Dog Act 1966 also presupposes a free 
individual who is necessarily required for liberal-based societies to function. But 
this individual has more freedom to choose, is less subjected by the Act and is much 
less ‘responsibilised’ by the Act. Self-governing is necessarily part of the 
intelligibility of both Acts. The self-governing of dog owners also occurs in relation 
to the attitudes and behaviours of non-owners; the extent and type of self-
government occurring in relation to these attitudes and current norms would require 
a sociological investigation. 
Mentalities of Rule 
The concept of governmentality outlined by Foucault,22 and developed by many 
others,23 provides a methodology to examine particular occurrences, taken-for-
                                                           
20  Dean (1999), p 168. 
21  Dean (1999), p 165. 
22  Foucault (1991, 2000). 
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granted assumptions and implied political rationalities. Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality is used to analyse contemporary practices, ‘revealing the ways in 
which their modes of exercising power depend on specific ways of thinking 
(rationalities) and specific ways of acting (technologies)’.24 This also relates to how 
citizens are subjectified — that is, made subject to rationalities in ways that 
constitute possibilities for subjectivity — and to how populations are governed. 
Using the concept of governmentality as an analytical device opens the possibility 
of making links between established and patterned ways of thinking or mentalities 
of rule. It also shows how mentalities of rule are, often implicitly, guiding the 
actions of policy-makers and how particular programs of regulation imagine their 
subjects and objects (in this case, pet owners, local councils and pets). Mentalities 
of rule are the ‘broad discourses of rule’25 within which governments form particular 
programs that address questions of how to govern a given problem or situation.  
In this case, the problem of regulating pets and owners has arisen due to the 
historical changes in animal–human relations from the 1960s to the 1990s. These 
changes required a different way of conceptualising the problem to be governed. 
The mentalities of rule moved from one focused on a more collective response to 
animal–human relations to a more individualised one. What dogs and owners do is 
the issue in both pieces of legislation (the embodiment of a mentality of rule), but 
the problem of how to govern the relevant subjects has changed. Governmentality 
‘pinpoints a specific form of representation; government defines a discursive field 
in which exercising power is rationalized’.26 The exercise of power is made rational 
through a certain conceptualisation of the ‘new’ problem. This new problem of 
controlling pet behaviour as an individualised problem forms part of a shift in the 
mentalities of rule towards responsibility as it is configured in neo-liberalism. Neo-
liberalism ‘tries to ground the imperatives of government upon the self-activating 
capacities of free human beings, citizens, subjects’.27 
Technologies of Rule 
Each of the Acts under consideration is a technology of rule. As a legal instrument, 
they put laws and regulations into place that construct and seek to govern the social 
in prescribed ways.28 The Acts are a response to a problematisation (discussed 
below) of the dog/companion animal situation. The neologism ‘governmentality’ 
                                                                                                                                         
23  For example, Rose (1999); Dean (1999); Hindess (1997). 
24  Barry et al (1996), p 5. 
25  O’Malley et al (1999), p 501. 
26  Lemke (2001), p 191. 
27  Rose (1999), p 64. 
28  The paper does not have the scope to consider the more sociological question of how 
non-dog-owning citizens have contributed to the regulatory relationship between dogs 
and their humans. To adequately address this issue would require qualitative research 
that asks non-owners about their attitudes towards dog owners and whether they take 
any action based on these attitudes. For a more complete study, owners would also need 
to be asked about their reactions or responses to non-owners. The paper is concentrating 
more on the social relations presented in the legislation and in the Bills, but makes some 
speculation on the mediated social relations around dog ownership. 
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captures the link between governing as an activity that requires specific techniques, 
instruments, technologies, procedures and ways of thinking (mentalities). Lemeke 
describes the technologies part of governmentality as follows: ‘For a political 
rationality is not pure, neutral knowledge which simply “re-presents” the governing 
reality; instead, it itself constitutes the intellectual processing which political 
technologies can then tackle.’29 In practice, governing occurs through an activity 
that is necessarily underpinned or framed within a mode of thought that, in turn, is a 
response to a problem of government. The legislation embodies the response to the 
problematisation of animal–human relations, and was constructed through and 
embodies the mentalities of rule used to address the problematisation. 
Critique of Governmentality 
O’Malley30 and O’Malley, Clifford and Shearing31 critique the tendency of 
systemisation in governmentality-based projects. This occurs when a mentality of 
rule — usually neo-liberalism or advanced liberalism — is accorded a reality 
without reference to the nature of this reality.32 There is often an acceptance of the 
‘content’ of neo-liberalism without returning to the texts, like those of Hayek and 
Freidman, that elaborate what this form of liberalism is and how it works. Instead 
the ‘contents’ have become systematised into a mentality of rule that can be applied 
to each new instance of regulation. The methodology becomes one of looking at the 
instance of regulation and identifying what matches the rationality of neo-liberalism 
— and, in the process, omitting or glossing over other forms of rule.  
Methodology 
As a partial counter to the issues outlined by O’Malley,33 the analysis is being done 
based on the language of the Acts and of the parliamentary debate. Each piece of 
legislation was read closely to establish categories within which the relevant 
sections of each Act could be located. The categories are: public spaces and the 
seizure of dogs; dangerous and nuisance dogs; civil and criminal liability of dog 
owners; and registration of dogs. In doing this, the entire legislation was examined 
for the changes that had occurred. Similarly, the debates were read to draw out the 
main versions of the point under consideration. The analysis moved from the data 
so that all major aspects of the legislation and debates were included, then to 
interpreting the changes through the governmentality approach.  
The parliamentary debates offer access to mentalities of rule that allow an 
analysis of ‘thought made practical and technical’.34 The central question is: How 
does each Act seek to govern? Each of the two Acts is analysed to answer the 
central question through comparing the two in terms of their formulation of the 
problem to be governed, their mentalities of rule, their means of objectification and 
                                                           
29  Lemeke (2001), p 1091. 
30  O’Malley (2001). 
31  O’Malley et al (1997) 
32  O’Malley (2001), p 18. 
33  O’Malley (2001). 
34  Dean (1999), p 18. 
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subjectification, and their associated technologies. As mentioned above, the 
analysis of Hansard partially addresses O’Malley’s argument that an ‘analytics of 
government’ that focuses on politics as mentalities of rule cannot be privileged over 
genealogical factors that see politics as contested social relations.35 The debates 
emphasise genealogy as critique and governing as having ‘a conceptualisation of 
politics as relations of contest and struggle which are constitutive of government 
rather than simply a source of programmatic failure and (later) redesign’.36 The 
limitation of the paper is a tendency to use the systematised categories of 
mentalities of rule which may obscure competing mentalities. However, one of the 
main purposes of the analysis is to examine the social relations imagined in the Acts 
(in the governmental reasons) and the political act is to challenge the adequacy of 
these imagined social relations and forms of subjectification. 
Governing Pets and Their Humans 
A brief overview of the legislation under discussion shows that, as a minimum, the 
quantities of regulation have increased. In the Dog and Goat Act 1898, there is little 
mention of the regulation of goats. The Act is very short, with only 24 sections in 
three parts. Primarily it covers the procedures for registration and the penalties for 
failing to register. The Dog Act 1966 replaces the Dog and Goat Act 1898. This Act 
is slightly larger, with 27 sections over six parts that cover the control, seizure and 
registration of dogs. The Companions Animal Act 1998 has 99 sections, and is 
obviously much larger than the Dog and Goat Act 1898 and Dog Act 1966; it covers 
dogs, cats and potentially other types of companion animals. The Companions 
Animal Act 1998 consists of nine parts, which include the compulsory identification 
and registration of companion animals, the responsibilities of owners of dogs and 
cats, and provisions and procedures for dealing with seized animals. The legislation 
is discussed initially to provide the data from which to consider the mentalities of 
rule. First, the specific problematisation of the animal–human relations as 
something to be governed is considered.  
Problematisation: Stated Purpose of the Acts 
Adapting Rose’s37 discussion, the legislation is the start point for a genealogical 
analysis of the problematisation of animal–human relations. The legislation is part 
of a ‘symptomatology’ that can be used to diagnose the questions around how to 
govern pets and their humans: ‘In reconstructing the problematisations which 
accord them intelligibility as answers, these grounds become visible, their limits 
and presuppositions are opened for interrogation in new ways.’38 The human–animal 
problem is evident in the changes in terminology and in the stated purposes of the 
Acts. The terminology was not an issue in the Dog and Goat Act 1898 and Dog Act 
1966, as a dog was a dog and a goat a goat. In section 5 of the Companions Animal 
Act 1998, ‘companion animal’ is defined as meaning a dog, a cat or ‘any other 
                                                           
35  O’Malley (2001), pp 18–19; O’Malley et al (1997), pp 502, 504. 
36  O’Malley et al (1997), p 505. 
37  Rose (1999), pp 57–58. 
38  Rose (1999), p58. 
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animal that is prescribed by the regulations as a companion animal’. In the first 
reading of the Companions Animal Act 1998, the minister stated: ‘The term 
“companion animal” was chosen to reflect the animal and community welfare focus 
of the new law. A companion animal is one kept for the welfare and benefit of both 
the animal and its owner.’39 The shift from ‘dog’ to ‘companion animal’ occurred to 
encompass the regulation of more animals and because, as Franklin shows, 
emotional attachments have changed to allow humans to have a companion and not 
a pet. However, the legislation is forced to use ‘owners’ when describing the 
responsibilities of humans for their cats and dogs. The animal is still something to 
be owned that is also a companion. 
The aims of the Dog Act 1966 are described as follows: ‘The principal objects 
of the Bill are to introduce an effective system of registration by municipal and 
shire councils; to provide better control of dogs; to empower councils to establish 
pounds for the reception of stray and unwanted dogs; and to repeal the existing Dog 
and Goat Act.’40 There is also brief and infrequent mention of legislating to 
encourage the love and care of dogs. The Companions Animal Act 1998 is overtly 
expressing a concern with animal welfare and management — not control, as in the 
Dog Act 1966: ‘The object of the Bill is to provide for the effective and responsible 
care and management of companion animals …’41 In the Companions Animal Act 
1998, the problem is configured as being one of responsible ownership of 
companion animals for the benefit of the animal (supposedly), of the owner, the 
community, the environment and wildlife (the problem of feral cats and dogs). In 
configuring animals in this way, the regulatory regime must be more encompassing 
than the Dog Act 1966, as there is more to protect.42 The later Act overtly requires a 
different kind of self-regulation in comparison to the earlier Act, as the problem of 
government is different. The presuppositions that make these Acts intelligible 
responses to these problematisations are discussed in the following sections. 
The impetus for the Companions Animal Act 1998 was a changing pattern of 
pet ownership, ‘partly as a result of different approaches to urban development and 
workforce participation’,43 and a change in community expectations about what is 
required of a responsible pet owner. In the 1960s, houses were further apart, with 
smaller houses on a block than now — that is, there was more yard and more 
distance between houses. During this period, dogs were allowed to wander the 
streets (part of the need for the Companions Animal Act 1998). Also, the 
participation of women in the workforce was much lower in the 1960s. In 
combination, these factors meant dog barking was potentially less annoying than 
now, as they had more yard in which to entertain themselves and freedom to roam, 
and there was a much greater chance that someone would be at home during the 
day. Urban consolidation44 has required changes to the regulation of cats and dogs, 
                                                           
39 Hansard, 6 May 1998, p 1. 
40 Hansard, 22 February 1966, p. 3420. 
41 Hansard, 6 May 1998. 
42  Section 4 of the Companions Animal Act 1998 is new, and states that the protection of 
native birds and animals in a policy objective of the state. 
43 Hansard, 6 May 1998. 
44  Newby (1999), p 230. 
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with too little consideration by town planners of what dogs need. Dogs are now 
much more reliant on their humans for mental stimulus and exercise. When humans 
find the time for this, there is the difficulty of finding the correctly designated off-
leash park. Newby45 argues that the problems that can arise with dogs are often 
sheeted home to irresponsible owners by the local council; however, she argues, 
‘some of what we are dealing with is not a people or animal problem at all. It is 
structural.’ 
The Companions Animal Act 1998 addresses the structural problem by 
requiring local councils to provide at least one off-leash area, which is clearly 
inadequate by any measure. The legislation does not state the size of the area, the 
location (how easy it is to get human and dog there) or whether it must be 
designated purely for dog use and not be shared by other users. Thankfully, most 
councils do provide more than one park. The parliamentary debate acknowledges 
the problems of urban consolidation for animals and owners, but falls woefully 
short of enacting laws to address them. Instead, the Regulations make councils (and 
owners) liable for a structural problem without specifying any criteria other than 
one off-leash area per council. The state government retains its law-
making/maintaining capacity without being responsible for its implementation; this 
is left to councils, community groups (like Monica’s Doggie Rescue and the St 
George Animal Shelter) and individuals. Garland46 calls this devolution of state 
powers into smaller units of organisations, community groups and individuals ‘the 
responsibilising strategy’.47 
Legislation: Technologies of Rule 
The Acts themselves are technologies of rule: ‘If political rationalities render reality 
into the domain of thought, these “technologies of government” seek to translate 
thought into the domain of reality, and to establish “in the world of persons and 
things” spaces and devices for acting upon those entities of which they dream and 
                                                           
45  Newby (1999), p 230. 
46  Garland (1996), pp 452–55. 
47  Garland’s concept of ‘responsibilisation’ is more applicable to the functioning of the 
Acts than the concept in the governmentality literature of ‘governing at a distance’. 
Rose (1999), pp 49–50 comments that: ‘Political forces instrumentalize forms of 
authority other than those of the “state” in order to “govern at a distance” in both the 
constitutional and spatial senses-distanced constitutionally, in that they operate through 
the decisions and endeavours of non-political modes of authority; distanced spatially, in 
that these technologies of government link a multitude of experts in distant sites to the 
calculations of those at the centre.’ Different political forces contributed to the creation 
of the Companions Animal Act 1998, as can be seen in the Hansard discussion. 
However, the Act is formally implemented through local councils and is therefore part 
of the state. In regulating dog–human relations, there is no non-state centre, nor forms 
of ‘non-political modes of authority’. Instead, to the extent that they can, councils 
(mostly in cases of dangerous/nuisance animals and less so in ensuring dogs are leashed 
and owners dispose of faeces correctly) are responsible for implementing the legislation. 
So the Companions Animal Act 1998 does not govern at a distance. It governs through a 
devolution of authority to councils, animal shelters and individual dog owners. 
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scheme.’48 Some of the provisions are technologies in themselves because they 
establish forms of acceptable behaviour and ban animals from certain places; others 
legislate for the use of technologies like microchipping the animals or compulsory 
registration. As Miller and Rose argue, these technologies are developed by policy-
makers to ‘shape, normalize and instrumentalise the conduct, thought, decisions and 
aspirations of others in order to achieve the objectives they consider desirable’.49 
The desired objective of the Dog Act 1966 is the control of dogs, and in the 
Companions Animal Act 1998 the objective is to make pet owners responsible. The 
main provisions that are in themselves technologies are those around the seizure 
and destruction of animals, including how this is dependent on the construction of 
public and private space, the classification of dangerous and nuisance animals and 
legal liability provisions, and the category of provisions that establish technologies 
centred around registration and monitoring procedures.  
Public Places and the Seizure of Dogs 
The procedure for seizure and destruction of dogs is similar for both the Dog Act 
1966 and the Companions Animal Act 1998. However, there are differences 
between the Acts as to what triggers the seizure of a dog. In the original Dog Act 
1966, there was no requirement that a dog should be contained on private property 
and there was no provision to require the constraint of a dog in public. A dog could 
be seized (s 10) if it was in a public place and not under effective control, or on land 
not belonging to its owner and without the land owner’s permission. The policy-
makers wanted to remove stray or lost dogs from the streets without limiting the 
options for responsible owners. These provisions were technologies that sought to 
achieve this by allowing dogs into public places provided they were under effective 
control — which does not necessarily require leashing.  
In 1981, the Dog Act 1966 was amended and: ‘For the first time in the history 
of the legislation in New South Wales an attempt was made to control the access of 
dogs to public places.’50 This was done via section 8(1), making a person guilty of 
an offence if their dog was in a public place and not under effective control via a 
leash or equivalent. This means that, currently, dogs cannot legally be walked off 
the leash anywhere in public except in designated off-leash areas (Companions 
Animal Act 1998, s 13). The Companions Animal Act 1998 goes further than this by 
listing a number of areas in which dogs (and cats) are expressly forbidden (ss 14, 
30) — including, for example, food preparation areas, children’s play areas, school 
grounds, childcare centres and wildlife areas. Once an owner has been warned, a 
dog can be seized if it is unleashed outside of a designated off-leash area or is in the 
prohibited areas. Specifying these areas is new. The stated purpose of the 
Companions Animal Act 1998 is the effective care and management of companion 
animals. In limiting animals’ access to certain places and requiring effective control 
via a leash, the management of the animal is achieved. Leashing the animal could 
be seen as caring for it, for example, by preventing it being hit by a car. However, 
the restriction of available public space is much more about management (or really 
                                                           
48  Miller and Rose (1990), p 8. 
49  Miller and Rose (1990), p 8. 
50 Law Reform Commission (1988), p 10. 
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control) than it is about the welfare and care of the animal. Owners are being 
governed through these provisions and their normalising capacity, in a way that 
diminishes their freedom to choose how to control their dog and where they can 
both go. 
Dangerous and Nuisance Dogs 
The Dog and Goat Act 1898 and the Dog Act 1966 do not explicitly classify 
animals as dangerous or nuisance. The Dog and Goat Act 1898 (s 12) allows for 
bulldogs and mastiffs or mongrels from these breeds to be destroyed if in public 
without a muzzle. The Dog Act 1966 (has special provisions for Greyhounds and 
Alsatians. However, the Companions Animal Act 1998 has categories of nuisance 
dogs (s 21) and cats (s 31), dangerous dogs (Part Five) and restricted breeds of dogs 
(ss 55–58). The nuisance cat and dog, and the restricted dog provisions, are new, 
and the dangerous dog provisions build on to those in the amended Dog Act 1966. 
Along with the classification, the Companions Animal Act 1998 also has detailed 
procedures for owners of these dogs and cats, including the power to declare a dog 
to be dangerous. These provisions are a response to the perception of risk by adding 
to the legislated responsibilities of owners and by removing their discretion and 
freedom of choice regarding where their dogs can go.  
Civil and Criminal Liability of Dog Owners 
Each Act establishes criteria for the civil and criminal legal liability of owners when 
their pet destroys property or injures a person or animal. Civil liability is similar in 
both Acts.51 Section 13 of the Dog and Goat Act 1898 makes it a criminal offence 
for a dog to rush at or attack any person, horse or bullock ‘whereby the life or limbs 
of any person are endangered or property injured’. Section 6 of the Dog Act 1966 
makes the owner of a dog criminally liable, or guilty of an offence, if the dog 
attacks or causes injury to a person or animal in a public place, or attacks or causes 
injury to a person ‘in or on any other place, who is lawfully in or on that place’. 
This extended the previous law by adding offences on private property. But the Dog 
Act 1966 also reduced the scope of an owner’s liability through not re-enacting 
threatening behaviour. This means that injury must be the direct result of the attack 
and not a result of being rushed at or threatened. The Companions Animal Act 1998 
(s 16(1)) extends the original Dog Act 1966 back towards the Dog and Goat Act 
1898 by making it an offence ‘if a dog rushes at, attacks, bites, harasses or chases 
any person or animal … whether or not any injury is caused to the person or 
                                                           
51  In the Dog Act 1966 (s 20), the dog’s owner is liable in damages for injury to any 
person, property or animal caused by the dog. As written, this does not distinguish 
between private and public property. However, because of this generality, it may have 
been given a more restrictive application by the courts (Law Reform Commission 
Report, 1988, n 35). Civil liability in the Companions Animal Act 1998 is covered in 
sections 25–28. The Companions Animal Act 1998 gives more details on civil liability; 
the basic intent is the same as sections 19–20, but exceptions are given and there is 
clarification that civil liability arises even when the dog causes injury, death or damage 
on its owner’s property. 
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animal’.52 So, in effect, an owner can be held criminally liable when no injury 
occurs. This seems like an attempt to try and regulate dogs’ animality, and the 
apparent irresponsibility of the owner. Dogs do rush at and chase each other as part 
of their normal interactions, and rarely is any harm caused. It also seems unclear as 
to how these terms would be defined by a court where no injury has occurred. This 
shift constructs dog behaviours as more threatening than the Dog Act 1966, and 
potentially criminally punishes anyone who does not prevent this kind of behaviour 
— that is, an irresponsible owner.  
Compulsory Registration of Dogs 
In general, the Acts outline the obligations of the agents of government in 
establishing, maintaining and enforcing registration systems, and the obligations of 
owners to register their pet and to make sure the animal has the visible signs of 
registration. The legislative establishment of an advisory board in the Companions 
Animal Act 1998 shows an elevation in the status of pets into something that needs 
to be more carefully understood, cared for and managed through advice from a 
range of professionals and community representatives. 
The administrative procedures have become more detailed and sophisticated in 
line with new information technologies and public/government expectations. The 
Companions Animal Act 1998 requires compulsory microchipping; there is a 
statewide register of dogs, no longer confined to local council areas; and 
registration is for the life of the dog. Microchipping is a new piece of technology 
that was unavailable in 1966. It gives a much greater degree of surveillance than 
just registration, and is aimed at returning lost dogs to their grateful owners and to 
dealing with irresponsible owners. Hansard argues that this is good for the welfare 
of the dog. In cases where the dog is loved, being returned to its owners is very 
positive. But there is no compulsion in the Act to take the dog back. This 
technology of rule does not necessarily help unwanted dogs.  
Mentalities of Rule: Risk, Responsibility, Freedom and Choice 
According to Miller and Rose, from around 1900 until the 1950s, the citizen was 
regarded as a social being whose powers and obligations were articulated in the 
language of social solidarity and social responsibility.53 From the 1960s, citizenship 
was manifested through free choice, personal freedom and self-fulfilment.54 The 
Dog Act 1966 gave individuals freedom to choose how to regulate their dog’s 
behaviour in accordance with the new laws. The Companions Animal Act 1998 
constructed the problem as being based in the need for better individual 
responsibility. This meant individuals lost the freedom of choice to the imperative 
to remove or diminish the new perceptions of risk. Rose55 argues that, in ‘advanced 
liberalism’, ‘the problem of freedom now comes to be understood in terms of the 
                                                           
52  There are some exceptions to this (s 16(2)), including if the dog was being mistreated, if 
the animal or person was trespassing or if the dog was acting in reasonable defence of a 
person or property.  
53  Miller and Rose (1990), p 23. 
54  Miller and Rose (1990), p 24. 
55  Rose (1999), p 84. 
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capacity of an autonomous individual to establish an identity through shaping a 
meaningful everyday life’. For the subject in the Companions Animal Act 1998, a 
meaningful life is to be shaped around responsible pet ownership. The ideational 
premises behind and within the legislation are mentalities of rule and modes of 
subjectification. 
As already argued, the main issue for both Acts is the control and management 
of dogs/companion animals. The main differences in Hansard, and in the Acts, can 
be analysed through considering how risk is constructed and how responsibility and 
(implicitly) freedom is constructed. Both Acts have explicit or implicit 
responsibilities of owners and government agencies and agents (councils or police). 
The major difference is that the Companions Animal Act 1998 has codified and 
named responsibilities. The differing forms of responsibility also bring different 
forms of subjectification and objectification. The debates provide an insight into the 
reasoning behind the legislation.  
Apart from the overall aim of the Dog Bill — that is, to remove packs of dogs 
from the streets — there is little implicitly or explicitly about danger and risk in the 
debate. This is typical of the arguments for the need to control dogs; the Bill ‘will 
empower shire and municipal councils to abate nuisances caused by stray dogs and 
to remove the menace of dog packs in outlying areas’.56 The main point of 
consensus is that there is a general nuisance or menace posed by stray dogs, and 
establishing a council-based procedure is the best way to deal with the problem.  
In the Dog Bill debate, the word ‘responsible’ appears occasionally in the 
record. The new responsibilities of councils are raised, especially those of running 
pounds and of registration procedures. Given that each local council area has unique 
conditions, ‘the final responsibility for reasonable yet effective discharge of its 
duties in the public interest must rest in each case with the local council … Dog 
owners also should realise that they have a responsibility to their fellow citizens in 
this matter.’57 The responsibility of the council is to gather up stray dogs and the 
owner’s responsibility is to make sure their dog does not become a stray. There is 
greater freedom of choice for individuals in this Act than in the Companions 
Animal Act 1998. 
The scope of responsible pet ownership is much wider in the Companion 
Animal Bill debate; no longer limited to effective dog control, responsibility 
extends to how having a pet affects neighbours, everyone else (the community), 
wildlife (Companions Animal Act 1998, s 4) and the environment. ‘It is the small 
number of irresponsible pet owners who cause most problems for the community. 
Their animals are the ones that roam the streets, pollute public areas, cause property 
damage, or attack people and other animals.’58 Reference is occasionally made to 
control, but it never forms a main theme in the discussion or a stated central 
purpose. For example: ‘There is certainly a need to constructively and sensibly 
control the behaviour of unwanted cats and dogs in the community. In many cases 
the biggest problem is trying to control the owners of the animals rather than the 
                                                           
56 Hansard (1966), p 3420. 
57 Hansard (1966), p 1174. 
58 Hansard, 6 May 1998. 
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animals themselves.’59 In both these debates, humans are clearly seen as the main 
problem to be addressed. However, the issue of human irresponsibility and animal 
‘innocence’ is much stronger in 1998 than in 1965–66.60 In 1965–66, the broader 
problem is packs of dogs, perhaps once caused by irresponsible owners but 
nevertheless a problem in itself. In 1998, the problem is unacceptable pet 
behaviours; however, the source is irresponsible owners. To this end, the Act 
defines the responsibilities of owners into legislation. This debate signals that the 
freedom to choose to have a pet comes with clearly defined responsibilities; 
whether these responsibilities are enforceable and/or are followed is a different 
issue. 
In ‘The Subject and Power’, Foucault uses the term ‘government’ to refer to 
forms of conduct that require human beings to do things and that involve the 
government of one’s self: ‘To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field 
of actions of others.’61 A necessary condition for power to function is freedom: ‘By 
this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of 
possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse 
comportments may be realised.’62 The Companions Animal Act 1998 clearly 
requires human beings to do things such as register and leash their dog, or 
potentially face a large fine. Given the difficulties of enforcing much of the 
legislation, there is a reliance on the pet owner to govern him or herself. As part of 
the liberal mentality of rule, freedom is one of the ways in which the individual 
comes to govern the self. Yet the freedom of pet owners has diminished. Pet owners 
have been ‘responsibilised’ in ways that make their choice an individual 
responsibility. However, within this narrowing of freedom, the responsible 
individual can still make choices. 
To digress to a personal example, why do I now pick up the dog’s poo in my 
trusty ever-present plastic bag? Not because I knew about the ‘poo amendment’ (a 
1981 amendment to the Dog Act 1966); I was picking up before the Companions 
Animal Act 1998 was being publicly discussed. In part, it has to do with probably 
unknowingly falling into the process of self-governing as a response to changes in 
attitudes towards dog ownership — that is, the imperative to be responsible not so 
much towards the dog but towards those who do not necessarily like dogs. I also 
began doing it because I saw other people do it, which had a normative function. 
Foucault63 argues that: ‘There are two meanings of the word subject: subject to 
someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by conscience 
or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and 
makes subject to.’ The normative function works with the liberal mentality of rule 
that ties my subjectivity to an identity composed of the responsibilised individual. 
Certainly, I still have the freedom to choose to scoop or not, as there is often no 
other person to tell me and there is never a council ranger to fine or threaten me; 
                                                           
59 Hansard, 21 May 1998. 
60  Cf Franklin’s (1999), pp 54–55 discussion of misanthropy. 
61  Foucault (1982), p 221. 
62  Foucault (1982), p 221. 
63  (1982), p 212. 
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mostly, though, I do the right thing. However, scooping is not without ambivalence. 
Is it better for the environment to put poo into a plastic bag and then into landfill, or 
to leave it to breakdown into the soil, or to introduce dung beetles in areas used 
frequently by dogs? Bagging is clearly not the ideal solution, but it is a solution that 
fits into the embodiment of the responsible individual being responsible for an 
individualised problem. The construction of the problem is that, as an individual, I 
chose to bring a dog into my suburb and the identity that goes with this choice — at 
least in my neighbourhood — is to be responsible for the dog’s behaviour.  
The care, welfare and management of pets constitute a common theme in the 
Companion Animal Bill debate. The Companions Animal Act 1998 introduces 
microchipping, which can be beneficial to a lost and wanted dog. However, there is 
little in the Act that is a clear and unambiguous benefit to the animal. Leashing in a 
public place can be beneficial, but it also curtails the dog’s freedom of movement. 
The specification of one off-leash area per council is ridiculous, and the listing of 
prohibited places also reduces the space available for dogs to exercise and interact. 
The criminal liability provisions are aimed at protecting people, property and 
animals, but define liable behaviour very widely in a way that can still catch 
responsible owners. The dogs — or, more accurately, the owners — are being 
managed, but the level of care given to dogs is limited. The concerns of the 
community are covered by nuisance and dangerous dog classifications, as well as 
by the control of public spaces and the criminal liability provisions. An attempt to 
protect wildlife is covered in the provisions covering the seizure and destruction of 
dogs. The environment is protected by limiting access to public places and through 
the ‘poo provision’. The Companions Animal Act 1998 is much more concerned 
with responsibilising owners in ways that ensure the welfare of the community, 
wildlife and the environment. 
Conclusion 
The Dog Act 1966 sought to govern dogs and humans through establishing a 
registration and impounding procedure. The Companions Animal Act 1998 sought 
to govern through legislating the responsibilities of pet owners and through banning 
pets from certain places. Using the governmentality approach, the Acts are seen as 
technologies of rule that are supported by certain mentalities of rule. Within this 
analysis, the social relations between dogs and humans in the Dog Act 1966 seems 
to be less problematic than those in the Companions Animal Act 1998. In the Dog 
Act 1966, dogs are a problem as strays and if a dog attacks others, but are otherwise 
generally just dogs in relation to their owners and others who may come in contact 
with them. In the Companions Animal Act 1998, and the debate, companion animals 
and their owners are given a much clearer social and legal connection through the 
‘responsibilisation’ of owners — responsibilities that extend to wildlife, the 
community and the environment. Does this configuration benefit the animals or 
humans, or both? The debate emphasises the animal’s welfare by, for example, 
microchipping facilitating the return of lost pets. In practice the legislation is 
primarily focused on the regulation of humans for the benefit of humans, and 
secondarily for the benefit of animals. 
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